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The First Sale Doctrine and Foreign Sales:
The Economic Implications in the United
States Textbook Market
Garry A. Gabison1
15 U. MASS. L. REV. 166
ABSTRACT
This Article investigates the impact of the Kirtsaeng decision. After discussing the
first sale doctrine, this Article presents the issues around implementing a worldwide
first sale doctrine. International treaties attempt to ensure that authors can benefit
from their work by affording them similar protections in different jurisdictions. But a
worldwide first sale exhaustion limits the ability of copyright holders to profit from
their work because it allows the author to compete with its own work that had been
priced differently in different jurisdictions. Finally, this Article tests whether, in the
United States, the price of textbooks has been affected by the Kirtsaeng decision and
finds that the price of textbooks increased between 2001 and 2018 but not more
rapidly or slowly after the decision. In other words, the decision may not have had
any effect (yet).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Like other property rights, copyright has been described as a
bundle of rights.2 The copyright first sale doctrine takes away one stick
from the bundle of rights. The first sale doctrine states that: “the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”3
What the rule against perpetuities does for real property,4 the first
sale doctrine does for copyright. The first sale doctrine limits how a
right holder controls a copyright-embodying work once it enters the
stream of commerce. Courts have used this doctrine to remove
uncertainties for purchasers of copyrighted goods.5 This doctrine
harmonizes the rights of purchasers by limiting the rights of copyright
holders.
The first sale doctrine arose because right holders attempted to use
copyrights to control how their copyright-embodying goods were
traded. For example, copyright holders have attempted to control how
their work can be priced6 or where their work can be sold.7 These
copyright holders raised copyright claims to avoid contract privity

2

3
4

5

6
7

See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1985)
(“Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the
owner of the copyright. Under the Copyright Act, these rights—to publish, copy,
and distribute the author’s work—vest in the author of an original work from the
time of its creation.”).
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).
See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 1 (3d ed.
1915). John Chipman Gray describes the rule against perpetuities as one of the
“transfers of rights in their nature alienable the law forbids” and as a limitation
“beyond which future interests cannot be created.” Id.
See generally Anne Layne-Farrar, An Economic Defense of Flexibility in IPR
Licensing: Contracting Around “First Sale” in Multilevel Production Settings,
51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1149, 1155–56 (2011) (“[T]he original rationale for
the first sale doctrine [is]: an increased certainty over the ‘price’ of a good,
arising when limits are placed on the parties that can be charged licensing fees.
If an end purchaser of a good has no reasonable way of knowing whether the
good comes with unseen obligations, such as licensing fees on the components
that form the inputs of the good, then uncertainty will hinder the exchange of
goods and the dissemination of the innovations underlying those goods.”).
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908).
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 525–26 (2013).
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requirements and antitrust liability.8 In response, the Supreme Court
created the first sale doctrine to rein in the copyright holders’ business
methods.9
Copyright holders have tested the limits of the first sale doctrine.
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, a book publisher argued that
copyright granted its holder the power to price differently based on the
location where each copyright-embodied work was sold.10 The
Supreme Court disagreed and instead expanded the reach of the U.S.
first sale doctrine.
This Article first discusses the law and economics behind the first
sale doctrine and the impact of the Kirtsaeng decision on the U.S.
textbook market. Section II provides an overview of the origin of the
first sale doctrine. It also discusses the overlay with international
copyright treaties. Section III discusses the law and economics of the
first sale doctrine and how copyright holders would geographically
price discriminate without such a doctrine. Price discrimination has
theoretical ambiguous effects on price and consumer welfare. Thus,
welfare analysis cannot support or disprove the efficiency of the first
sale doctrine. Section IV empirically measures the impact of the
Kirtsaeng decision on the price of textbooks in the U.S. The first sale
doctrine made price discrimination more difficult to implement.
Publishers cannot prevent arbitrage11 between low-price countries and
the high-price U.S. anymore. Nonetheless, the decision has had no
impact on the pricing behavior of textbooks in the U.S.
II. COPYRIGHT, FIRST SALE DOCTRINE, AND FOREIGN SALES
Even before it was adopted by Congress, the first sale doctrine had
a long common law history.12 This section discusses the Supreme
8

9

10
11

12

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 487 (2011)
(discussing the relationship between first sale doctrine and contractual
relationship as well as antitrust scrutiny).
See id. Hovenkamp questions the necessity of the doctrine when antitrust laws
can be used to limit copyright in the same way as the first sale doctrine does. Id.
at 503–04.
568 U.S. at 525.
Arbitrage is “[t]he simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in another of a
security or commodity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the
different markets.” Arbitrage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538.
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Court’s jurisprudence of the doctrine. This section then addresses how
international treaties affect the first sale doctrine. Finally, it examines
the public policy implications of the first sale doctrine and of the
Kirtsaeng ruling.
A. A Brief History of the First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine has a long history. Justice Breyer traces it to
1628 England: “In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the
common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of
chattels . . . . A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale
or other disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly ‘against Trade
and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting.’”13
The U.S. version of the first sale doctrine is more recent. The
doctrine was first discussed by the Supreme Court in 1908 in BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus14 and arose out of common law.15
In Bobbs-Merrill, the copyright holder attempted to impose a
resale price maintenance—which occurs when an upstream supplier
agrees or requires that the supplied good be sold at a specific price to a
downstream retailer.16 The defendant, Macy’s department store,
decided to undercut this price.17 The plaintiff argued that a copyright
holder only grants a license to a retailer and under this license, the
copyright holder is able to control the price at which the retailer could
sell the product to consumers.18
At that time, the Court had not yet made resale price maintenance
per se illegal,19 which made the Bobbs-Merrill ruling all the more
important. In Bobbs-Merrill, the Court ruled that:
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

Id. at 538–39 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360 (1628)).
210 U.S. 339, 343 (1908).
Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538.
210 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
In 1911, the Supreme Court made resale price maintenances per se illegal. Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408–09 (1911). It
remained per se illegal until 2007 when the Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles
Medical. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900
(2007). In other words, it took three years for the Supreme Court to extend the
bar on resale price maintenance, as articulated in Bobbs-Merrill, for copyright
products to all products. Resale price maintenance aimed at decreasing the intrabrand competition and encouraging inter-brand competition. Contrary to what
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In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of
the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not
create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this
case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future
purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.20

The Court thus limited the control that copyright holders had over their
copyrighted works once put into the stream of commerce. The Court
feared that without such a rule the copyright holder would be able to
dictate and limit what would happen to its copyright-embodying
products.21
The following year, Congress codified the doctrine in the
Copyright Act of 1909.22 The Act specified that “the copyright is
distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted”23 and
that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict
the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which
has been lawfully obtained.”24
The current version was modified by the Copyright Act of 1976.25
It specifies that “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully
made . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”26
B. The First Sale Doctrine and International Trade
The first sale doctrine has so far dealt with nationally traded
copyrighted works. However, these works are also traded across the
globe. It was not until ninety years after creating the first sale doctrine

20
21

22

23
24
25

26

Hovenkamp advocates, the antitrust laws may not be a save-all panacea—even if
the copyright holder implemented anticompetitive behaviors. See Hovenkamp,
supra note 8, at 487.
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350.
Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998) (“The
whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a
copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his
exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”).
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 33 Stat. 1075, amended by
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–810 (1976)).
Id. at § 41.
Id.
Copyright Act of 1976 § 109 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of transfer
of particular copy or phonorecord).
Id. at § 109(a).
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that the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the international trade of
copyrighted works. Until then, the question remained open whether
copyright holders could control the distribution of copyrighted
products imported to the U.S.
In 1998, the Supreme Court investigated this question in Quality
King Distributors v. L’anza Research International, where the Court
decided whether the first sale doctrine applied to imported copies.27 In
Quality King, the plaintiff, L’anza, was a manufacturer of hair care
products.28 The products had copyrighted labels attached to them and
L’anza enforced a territorial restriction on the product.29 One or
multiple shipments aimed for the European market made their way
into the U.S. stream of commerce.30 L’anza argued that, as a copyright
holder, it could bar the entry of such products into the U.S. because the
“importation and subsequent distribution of those products bearing
copyrighted labels violated L’anza’s ‘exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106, 501 and 602 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted
material in the United States.’”31 The District Court, Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court all rejected this argument
under the first sale doctrine.32
The Supreme Court highlighted an important distinction: this case
did not involve copyright piracy.33 The copyright holder “does not
claim that anyone has made unauthorized copies of its copyrighted
labels. Instead, [the copyright holder] is primarily interested in
protecting the integrity of its method of marketing the products to
which the labels are affixed.”34 Much like in previous cases, the
plaintiff attempted to use copyright to circumvent issues of contract
privity.35

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998).
Id.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 140, 152, 154.
Id. at 146–48.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 143. The copyright holder advanced that “contractual provisions are
inadequate to protect it from the actions of foreign distributors who may resell
[the copyright holder’s] products to American vendors unable to buy from [its]
domestic distributors.” Id.
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This argument did not move the Supreme Court. The Court ruled
that § 602 does not prohibit the importation of copyrighted material;36
§ 106 grants the copyright holder the exclusive right to distribute
copies;37 and § 109 authorizes the resale of legally purchased copies—
including to another person in another country.38 The Court expanded
the first sale doctrine to protect subsequent purchasers from an
infringement liability standpoint: “whether [they purchased] from a
domestic or from a foreign reseller, [they are] obviously an ‘owner’ of
that item.”39
Comments from the majority and concurring opinions left some
doubts about the reach of the first sale doctrine. The majority opinion
referred to trademark but refused to make the parallel with the “gray
market.”40 Justice Ginsburg stated that “[t]his case involves a ‘round
trip’ journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to
places abroad, then back again . . . . [W]e do not today resolve cases in
which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad.”41
Commentators worry that the Quality King ruling meant that the first
sale doctrine would treat goods manufactured home and abroad
differently.42
The Supreme Court returned to this open question fifteen years
later. In Kirtsaeng, the defendant was a Thai college student who
moved to the U.S. to study mathematics.43 During his studies, he asked
his family to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand and ship them to him
in the United States as the books were cheaper in Thailand.44 After

36

37

38
39
40
41
42

43
44

Id. at 146–51. The Supreme Court held that § 602 prohibits the importation of
copyrighted copies and does not extend to “copies that are lawfully made under
the law of another country.” Id. at 148. As such, it would not apply since the
good was manufactured in the U.S.
Id. at 144. The Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to the
rights granted under § 106. Id. at 150.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 145, 152–53.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Michael Stockalper, Case Note and Comment, Is There a Foreign “Right” of
Price Discrimination Under United States Copyright Law? An Examination of
the First-Sale Doctrine as Applied to Gray-Market Goods, 20 DEPAUL J. ART
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 513, 514–15 (2010).
568 U.S. 519, 527 (2013).
Id.
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using them, he was able to resell them in the U.S. for a profit.45 A
publisher of such textbooks filed a suit for copyright infringement and
illegal importation of copyrighted products.46 The defendant argued
that the material was lawfully manufactured and purchased.47 He also
argued that the copyright holder authorized the production and sale of
these books in Thailand.48 As such, he invoked the first sale doctrine.49
The Court discussed whether “[the] ‘first sale’ doctrine applies
only to ‘the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this
title.’”50 The Court distinguished Kirtsaeng from Quality King. In
Quality King, the goods made a round trip and as such were made
under the U.S. copyright title whereas, in Kirtsaeng, the goods were
made abroad.51 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the first sale
doctrine had geographical boundaries, and it held that the first sale
doctrine should be interpreted non-geographically.52
The Supreme Court stepped away from a literal interpretation of
“lawfully made under this title” because it would make the first sale
doctrine unworkable.53 The Kirtsaeng textbook was legally made and
purchased abroad so it should be allowed to move within the stream of
commerce without constraints.54 Any other interpretation would grant
a copyright holder more power over foreign-manufactured books, as
compared to locally-manufactured books.55
The Quality King and Kirtsaeng rulings have the potential to
impact the price of copyrighted products in the U.S. and abroad. The
next section discusses that impact as well as copyright treaties and
how the treaties can influence the U.S. ruling and interpretation of the
first sale doctrine.

45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id. at 525, 527.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 527, 530.
Id. at 528 (quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 218–19 (2d
Cir. 2011)).
Id. at 525.
Id. at 529–30.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 533.
Id.
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C. The First Sale Doctrine and International Treaties
The Court distinguished between copyrighted products
manufactured in the U.S. (Quality King) and those manufactured
abroad (Kirtsaeng). In reality, the ideas and embodiment of the
copyrighted works remained the same, regardless of where they were
produced. In both, the copyrighted goods targeted foreign markets.
They were sold at lower prices as compared to the home market. So,
the impact on the copyright holder would be the same regardless of
where the copyrighted good was manufactured. In Kirtsaeng, Justice
Kagan’s concurrence points to this problem: both should be treated the
same.56
In Kirtsaeng, Justice Ginsburg disagreed. She wrote in her dissent
that the majority had applied the first sale doctrine to “copies that were
‘lawfully made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but
instead, under the law of some other country.”57 She argued that
Congress had not intended for such a reading but instead intended for
the first sale doctrine to apply to domestic made copies, not foreign
manufactured copies of copyrighted works.58
The Justices disagreed about the same principle as it applied to a
different proxy. Copyright laws aim at promoting progress in the
arts.59 Without being able to profit, authors may be less inclined to
write, and the arts may not progress. Therefore, the first sale doctrine
should apply when an author has been able to benefit from its labor—
regardless of the amount profited.60
56
57

58
59

60

Id. at 555–57 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 559–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Quality King Distribs. v.
L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 147 (1998)).
Id. at 561–64.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
Justice Ginsburg made the comparison between the first sale doctrine and its
parallel in the patent system, the patent exhaustion doctrine. In Impression
Products v. Lexmark International, she argues that because patent protection is
territorial, as compared to copyright where countries harmonize their protection,
then the patent exhaustion doctrine should not extend to patent-embodying
products made outside the U.S. 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an in-depth discussion of the
patent exhaustion doctrine, see Garry A. Gabison, Worldwide FRAND Licensing
Standard, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 139, 154–62 (2019).
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Authors can profit from exploiting their rights in foreign countries
because these countries afford comparable copyright protections. The
U.S. Copyright Act reflects the copyright treaties that the U.S. has
joined.61 The U.S. is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”) and
the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”). In total, 176 other
countries are signatory to the Berne Convention62 and 101 other
countries are signatory to the UCC.63
The Berne Convention was adopted in Berne, Switzerland in 1886
and later amended in 1979.64 The U.S. passed the Berne Convention in
198865 and the Convention entered into force in 1989.66 The Berne
Convention aimed at removing formalities for foreign works to obtain
copyright protection.67 The UCC was adopted in Geneva in 1952.68

61
62

63

64

65

66

67

68

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
As of February 13, 2020, 177 countries were signatories to the Berne
Convention. Contracting Parties, Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15
[https://perma.cc/FG93-2UV2].
As of February 13, 2020, 102 countries were signatories to the UCC.
Contracting Parties/Signatories, Universal Copyright Convention, WIPO LEX,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=208&group
_id=22http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=208
&group_id=22 [https://perma.cc/P85X-4D8C].
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ [https://perma.cc
/YLZ8-YV4A].
Treaties and Contracting Parties, United States of America, WORLD INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1045C
[https://perma.cc/7WFX-9HAM].
“The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of
September 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971. Appearing within
parentheses is the latest Act of the Convention to which the listed country is
party. The Berne Convention, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended
on October 2, 1979, did not enter into force with respect to the United States
until March 1, 1989.” 17 U.S.C. § 104 note (2020) (Key to Symbols: Treaties
and Conventions: Berne).
Cosmetic Ideas v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010),
abrogated by Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 139 S. Ct.
881 (2019).
World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, Schedules II to IV,
WIPO LEX, https://wipolex.wipo.int/zh/text/125542 [https://perma.cc/GN34BEYB].
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The U.S. ratified the UCC in 1954 and it came into force in 1955.69
The UCC attempted to accommodate for countries who disagreed with
the Berne Convention.70
These treaties attempt to harmonize copyright protection. Since
these signatory countries afford copyright holders similar protections,
“under this title” could be read narrowly or broadly. A narrow reading
implies that protection of copyright extends only to works made under
the U.S. Copyright Act (i.e., in the U.S.). A broad reading implies that
the protection applies to works made under comparable foreign laws
that arose out of the same treaty. In other words, the merger of the U.S.
copyright law with other treaties would imply the merger of other
principles or doctrines and the first sale doctrine should subsequently
be harmonized as well.
Harmonization can take two forms. Each jurisdiction could
construe its first sale doctrine as stopping at its border. The doctrine
would specify that any product manufactured and sold within a given
jurisdiction could be resold without the consent of the right holder
within that jurisdiction but not beyond. Alternatively, the first sale
doctrine could cover all treaty jurisdictions. If an author copyrights his
or her work in such a jurisdiction, the right holder enjoys copyright
protection in all signatory countries.71 A goods purchaser should be
able to resell the goods under the first sale doctrine in any signatory
jurisdiction. In other words, the copyrighted goods should be able to
move within the stream of commerce in treaty countries—regardless
of the premium the right holder received.
The first version of harmonization provides clear limitations. A
copyright holder could argue that intellectual property grants the right
69

70

71

17 U.S.C. § 104 note (2020) (Key to Symbols: Treaties and Conventions: UCC)
(“Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Came into force on September 16, 1955.
United States became a party, effective on that same date.”).
Dr. Silke von Lewinski, The Role and Future of the Universal Copyright
Convention, COPYRIGHT BULL. (UNESCO), Oct.–Dec. 2006, at 1.
The majority opinion in Impression Products v. Lexmark International compares
the first sale doctrine to the patent exhaustion doctrine. 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1535–
36 (2017). Both doctrines limit the ability of the right holder to control the
intellectual property embodying good once it reaches the stream of commerce.
Id. at 1536–37. The majority opinion remarks that “[e]xhaustion does not
depend on whether the patentee receives a premium for selling in the United
States, or the type of rights that buyers expect to receive. As a result, restrictions
and location are irrelevant; what matters is the patentee’s decision to make a
sale.” Id. at 1538. Extrapolating to copyright, the right holder is not guaranteed a
U.S. premium but only to receive some form of premium.

178

UMass Law Review

v. 15 | 166

to stop the movement between borders.72 Because market conditions
differ substantially, these markets ought to be treated separately.73
In the textbook market, prices depend on many factors (i.e.,
demand for the product, budget constraint, competition, etc.).
Therefore, adapting to the market condition ensures that the individual
self-interests of market participants maximize societal welfare.74
Without a jurisdictional first sale doctrine, publishers would have to
use a single price, which could price some consumers out of the
market in some jurisdictions.
The second version of harmonization facilitates trade. The
signatory countries could all decide that the first sale doctrine would
apply to all goods made in a treaty jurisdiction. The purchasers and
sellers of goods need not worry about the origin of the product as long
as it came from a treaty country. Such harmonization would simplify
the flow of copyrighted goods between signatory countries because
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers could move their goods between
signatory jurisdictions without having to obtain an authorization or
license from the copyright holder. The Kirtsaeng majority opted for
this approach.75 Under this approach, applying the first sale doctrine
determination depends on whether the author had benefited (i.e.,
whether the product originated from a treaty country).
In the Kirtsaeng case, the work was developed and originated in
the U.S.76 It was then affixed onto paper in Thailand. Both countries
were signatories to both treaties. So, the copyright holder enjoyed
protection in both countries. This protection allowed the publisher to
claim supracompetitive prices in Thailand—even if the publisher could
have sold the book in the U.S. at a higher price.
Justice Ginsburg considered the implications of international
treaties. She pointed out that other countries do not have a first sale
72
73
74

75
76

Id. at 1535–36.
Id.
This idea that an individual’s self-interest leads to a socially efficient outcome
was first developed by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. ADAM SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 231 (Simon & Brown 2010) (1776). This is now
referred as the “invisible hand.” Id.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 530 (2013).
Id. at 527. If the work was not protected in the manufacturing country (e.g., lack
of copyright system) and the work was then imported to the U.S., the work
could qualify as pirated. This pirated work could be excluded from the U.S.
because, in this example, the publisher is never able to reap some benefits from
his work. Id. at 532–33.
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doctrine as broad as the U.S. and lamented the adoption of such a
broad doctrine.77 She argued that the World Trade Organization, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
World Intellectual Property Organization, and other treaties do not
create a consensus on the first sale doctrine.78 Therefore, she argued
that the Court should not interpret the U.S. first sale doctrine to mean
an international first sale doctrine.79
Both her dissent and the majority opinion failed to discuss whether
Thailand had such protection. The presence of such a treaty should
have been part of the deliberation. Some courts have considered
international treaties when deciding other issues such as
infringement.80 The first sale doctrine question should enjoy a similar
treatment.81
The next section discusses in more detail the economics of the first
sale doctrine and its policy implications.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
This section discusses the impact of the first sale doctrine on the
incentives of consumers to purchase the copyrighted product and the
incentives of authors to write books.
A. The First Sale Doctrine and End Users
The first sale doctrine affects the incentives of wholesalers,
retailers, and consumers to purchase the product. Wholesalers and
77
78
79
80

81

Id. at 573–78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 557.
See InduSoft, Inc. v. Taccolini, No. 13–50042, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014)
(West) (“We discern no conflict arising out of InduSoft’s copyright infringement
claims because both Brazil and the United States are signatories of the Universal
Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works. Those agreements commit each country to apply foreign
copyright law when required.”).
In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court highlighted that the sale was voluntary. The
Court left open the question of whether the first sale doctrine applies only when
the benefits are voluntarily extracted (i.e., the copyright holder sold the good at
the price it wanted in the treaty country) or when the benefits are not voluntarily
negotiated (i.e., a court ordered the copyright holder to sell its product at a
specific price). This question remains open for patents and the patent exhaustion
doctrine as well.
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retailers buy copyrighted products to resell them for a profit.
Consumers buy these products to consume and, after consumption,
they may want to sell the product as well. Their ability to resell these
copyrighted products depends on whether the good is free of claims.82
The first sale doctrine ensures that copyrighted goods are free of any
claims.
Additionally, besides being free of claims, the first sale doctrine
decreases transaction costs.83 The doctrine sets the boundaries of
property rights for each market participant.84 The consumers need not
contact the copyright holder before selling the good. Thus, the doctrine
eliminates the need for negotiations and the associated hold-up
problems.85
The ability and ease of resale increases consumers’ willingness to
purchase and pay for the copyrighted good. This greater willingness to
engage with copyrighted goods benefits the copyright holders. In other
words, by removing uncertainties (such as competing claims and
transactions costs), the first sale doctrine indirectly incentivizes
authors by ensuring consumers are willing to partake in the market for
copyrighted products.

82

83

84

85

See, e.g., Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale
Restraints, 1 BYU L. REV. 55 (2014) (discussing how the first sale doctrine
implication can help circumvent issues of imperfect vertical integration to
incentivize the efficient use of copyrighted goods by decreasing transaction
costs).
Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 541–43; see Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright
Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741 (2015) (discussing the use of the first sale
doctrine as a means to decrease transaction costs).
Transaction costs play an important role in voluntary transactions. See R. H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960) (“[T]he
granting of an injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the
liability to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued (or may
prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if market transactions were
costless.”). The Coase Theorem can be rephrased to say that without transaction
costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of the law. Id. at 12–21.
Delaminating property rights decreases the transaction costs associated with
trading goods. Id. It removes uncertainty about the reach of the right holder. Id.
A holdup problem occurs when the right holder leverages its exclusionary rights
to extract supra-competitive profits from a right user who already invested.
Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright
Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 212 (2006) (discussing the
hold-up problem within the context of second generation works of art).
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Furthermore, the first sale doctrine ensures that some consumers
can access the copyrighted product through public lending and
commercial rentals (e.g., library and rental).86
The Kirtsaeng majority worried about the welfare of consumers.87
If the consumers are willing to participate in the market, the authors
will be incentivized to join and supply copyrighted products. Justice
Ginsburg, in her dissent, worried more about the incentive created for
copyright owners.88 She argued that the first sale doctrine is
unnecessary to reach those efficiencies.89
Courts (and policymakers) can adjust the breath, depth, and length
of copyright to reach the correct balance.90 When adjusting these
dimensions, they have to balance the interest of the copyright holders
against the interest of copyright users. Benefiting one often harms the
other. While Justice Ginsburg worried more about the copyright
holders, the majority worried more about copyright users. Research
has shown that the optimal mix can be complicated to obtain and

86

87
88
89

90

R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REV. 577, 583–92 (2003) (discussing how the first sale doctrine can
open access to many users through resale, public lending, etc.).
568 U.S. at 540–41.
Id. at 575 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
First, Justice Ginsburg argued the first sale doctrine was overbroad because
vertical restrictions have procompetitive effects. Id. at 577–78. Second, the
majority argued that the decreased transaction costs also benefit the judicial
system. Id. at 538–39 (majority opinion). The first sale doctrine enhances
judicial efficiencies because courts need not trace the origin of the goods. Justice
Ginsburg argues that a clear rule that imported goods do not fall under the first
sale doctrine could reach a similar outcome. Id. at 579–80 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Third, copyright holders have private incentives not to exercise
control over second markets because consumers would have a lower willingness
to pay with goods carrying potential copyright claims. Id. at 582–83, 585 n.26.
See, e.g., Stefan Voigt, Determinants of Judicial Efficiency: A Survey, 42 EUR.
J.L. & ECON 183 (2016) (providing a literature review of the determinants of
judicial efficiency).
These dimensions have been discussed in detail by scholars. See, e.g., Richard
Watt, The Past and the Future of the Economics of Copyright, 1 REV. ECON.
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 151 (2004). “Copyright can be defined according to
1. duration; the length of time for which the legal copyright is enforced,
2. depth; the particular aspects of the creation that are protected (and
those that are not), and
3. breadth; what particular acts are deemed to be copyright infringing (and
what are not).” Id. at 157.
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extending copyright does not necessarily lead to more or better work
product.91
The same issue could be said of the first sale doctrine.
Implementing a narrow first sale doctrine, as Justice Ginsburg argued,
may not lead to more or better works. In fact, it may lead to more
returns for copyright holders without benefits for copyright users. The
next section discusses how the first sale doctrine affects copyright
holders and their incentives.
B. The First Sale Doctrine and Copyright Holders
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress authority to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”92 To this end, Congress created the copyright
system. Within this system, copyright grants authors an exclusive right
to exploit the expression of an idea. Copyright attempts to incentivize
authors to create original works.93
The first sale doctrine affects the exploitation rights and the
associated incentives of a copyright holder in a number of ways. First,
the first sale doctrine turns every copyrighted product into a durable
good. Without the first sale doctrine, a consumer would be limited in
their ability to enjoy the good. The enjoyment would be nominal and
limited to the first consumer. With the first sale doctrine, a consumer

91

92
93

Some scholars have questioned whether these dimensions have been correctly
set. For example, Michela Giorcelli and Petra Moser tested empirically the
impact of copyright on the production rate and quality of opera following the
staggered introduction of copyright in Italy. They found that copyright did
improve both the rate and quality of operas but moving from a twenty-year
copyright protection to a thirty-year copyright protection had no impact on
either dimension. Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyrights and Creativity:
Evidence from Italian Opera 25–28 (May 16, 2019), https://ssrn.com /abstract=
2505776 [https://perma.cc/922A-65EP].
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
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can legally resell the copyrighted book. Therefore, the right holder
enters into competition with the first period purchaser.
A copyright holder can resolve this problem94 without resorting to
the law. A copyright holder can increase the price of their product in
period one to capture the monopoly profits of multiple follow-on
consumers. A copyright holder can use a lease-only business where
they retain ownership of the copyrighted work and lease its use.95 This
approach has become more widespread with the vulgarization of
digital media.96
Second, the first sale doctrine decreases the right holder’s ability to
price discriminate.97 Without the first sale doctrine, a right holder
could charge different prices in different jurisdictions and prevent
94

95

96

97

R. H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON 143 (1972). Coase
investigated the durable good problem within the monopoly context. Id. at 143.
He used the example of the monopolist where a durable good is nondepreciable. Id. He found that the competition from the second-hand market
drives the price of the good to competitive level even in the first period when
consumers are willing to temporally displace their consumption. Id. at 143–44.
The relative mass of impatient and patient consumers affects the willingness to
pay for the good in the first period: impatient consumers will be willing to pay
more because they know they can recoup some cost in the second period. See,
e.g., Nancy L. Stokey, Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing, 12
BELL J. ECON. 112 (1981) (establishing that the buyers’ expectations depend on
the stock of the durable good). This problem has been referred as the Coase
Conjecture. See, e.g., Faruk Gul et. al, Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and
the Coase Conjecture, 39 J. ECON. THEORY 155, 156 (1986).
See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow, Durable-Goods Monopolists, 90 J. POL. ECON. 314
(1982) (discussing how monopolists who manufacture durable goods benefit
more by renting rather than selling the good); Michael Waldman, Eliminating
the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing, 40
J.L. & ECON. 61 (1997) (explaining that one way durable goods manufacturers
use a lease-only policy is to eliminate the market for secondhand goods).
Unsurprisingly, textbook publishers have used digital and rental textbooks to
attempt to keep control of their copyright. According to a report from 2017/2018
by the National Association of College Stores (“NACS”), 45% of students have
rented one or more textbooks. NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. STORES, HIGHLIGHTS
FROM STUDENT WATCH ATTITUDES & BEHAVIORS TOWARD COURSE MATERIALS
2017-18 REPORT, https://www.nacs.org/research/studentwatchfindings.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D5VM-7YA8] [hereinafter, NACS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM
STUDENT WATCH]. In the same report, NACS also found 25% of students
bought digital versions of their textbooks. Id. These methods avoid putting
durable goods on the market that compete with the right holder.
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications
for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1374–75 (1998) (describing every
intellectual property right as a tool to price discriminate).
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arbitrage.98 With the first sale doctrine, a low-value consumer can
resell to a high-value consumer. The resale prevents the right holder
from collecting high premiums. The price discrimination (and its
absence) has ambiguous price and welfare effects.99 This issue is
discussed in more detail in section IV.A.
Third, the first sale doctrine eliminates the right holder’s ability to
dictate vertical restrictions on the retailer based on copyright grounds.
For example, the right holder cannot use copyright to dictate the resale
price to consumers.100 Resale price maintenance has ambiguous
welfare effects.101 But, it always decreases the intra-brand competition
and likely increases prices.102 Resale price maintenance and other
vertical restrictions are, however, not barred.103 The first sale doctrine
prevents the right holder from using copyright law to justify these
vertical restrictions,104 which are better dealt with through contract
law.105

98

99

100
101

102
103

104

105

“Effective price discrimination requires satisfaction of three conditions: (1) the
seller has market power; (2) the seller can sort customers according to their
preferences; and (3) customers cannot arbitrage away price differentials.”
Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 850 (1997).
See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 870 (1985) (discussing how, in a simplified model, allowing price
discrimination can increase social welfare).
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 370–71 (1985).
Id. at 372.
Resale price maintenance can violate the antitrust laws under a rule of reason.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007).
Other vertical restrictions can also violate the antitrust laws (e.g., territorial
restraints). See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.17 (1977).
In the textbook industry, publishers still frequently implement resale price
maintenance. For example, the United States v. Apple case involved an antitrust
violation where six publishers colluded to change the e-book pricing model from
a wholesale model where the retailers could price at will once they acquire the
book to an agency model where the publishers retain control over the price. 791
F.3d 290, 327 (2d Cir. 2015). The agency model artificially created a resale
price maintenance by being combined with a most favored nation clause. Id. at
304.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 552–53 (2013). The Court
considered contract law better situated to deal with restrictions such as territorial
restrictions. Id.
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The Kirtsaeng Court argued that the doctrine encourages
competition at the retail level.106 The resale price maintenance
discussed in Bobbs-Merrill and the territorial restrictions discussed in
Quality King and Kirtsaeng aim at decreasing intra-brand
competition.107
Intra-brand competition occurs when different distributors of the
same (copyrighted) products compete for the same consumers.108 The
first sale doctrine encourages resellers to compete over price. If the
consumers value lower prices, they will benefit from the first sale
doctrine;109 but if they value the additional services associated with the
product (e.g., the ability to exchange the product), then allowing
vertical restraints may benefit societal welfare.110
In the textbook case, consumers usually place price first111 because
teachers select textbooks whereas students pay for the textbooks.112
Students are more price sensitive than teachers and they do not value

106
107

108

109
110
111

112

Id. at 539.
Intra-brand competition is facilitated by barring vertical restraint; however,
intra-brand can be considered procompetitive. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,
48 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9 (1981) (arguing that vertical restriction should be per
se legal based on efficiency reasons and that “territorial restriction affects both
price and service competition; the [resale] price restriction affects only price
competition.”).
See Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition,
108 Q.J. ECON. 61 (1993) (modeling intra-brand competition and finding that if
a large proportion of consumers values low prices over services, retailers will
overemphasize price competition and underemphasize service competition
relative to the efficient levels).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 63–64.
The textbook market suffers from the principal-agent problem because the
purchase decisionmaker differs from the cost bearer. Principal-agent problems
are a version of the moral hazard problem. See Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmström,
The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: FIFTH WORLD
CONGRESS 75–76 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987).
Although surveyed teachers considered the cost of the material in their material
selection, only 12% considered it to be the most important factor in their
material selection decision. NAT’L ASSOC. OF COLL. STORES, HIGHLIGHTS FROM
FACULTY WATCH ATTITUDES & BEHAVIORS TOWARD COURSE MATERIALS
2016-17 REPORT (2017), http://www.nacs.org/research/FacultyWatchKey
Findings2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/VT2D-PQA6].
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additional services as much.113 Students could benefit from barring
vertical restraints.
The Kirtsaeng decision made third degree price discrimination
more difficult. The next section discusses whether it benefitted
American textbook consumers.
IV. THE IMPACT OF KIRTSAENG ON THE PRICE OF TEXTBOOKS IN
THE UNITED STATES
The Kirtsaeng ruling made price discrimination more difficult.
This section first discusses how publishers can react to facing more
arbitrage. This section then tests whether this decision had any effect
on the pricing behavior of textbook publishers.
A. Third Degree Price Discrimination
Third degree price discrimination114 refers to the practice of
charging different prices to different consumers based on observable
characteristics. As Justice Ginsburg explained: “Because economic
conditions and demand for particular goods vary across the globe,
copyright owners have a financial incentive to charge different prices
for copies of their works in different geographic regions.”115 In
Kirtsaeng, the publisher requested the ability to engage in
geographical price discrimination. But “[t]heir ability to engage in
such price discrimination, however, is undermined if arbitrageurs are
permitted to import copies from low-price regions and sell them in
high-price regions.”116

113

114

115

116

In 2017-18, 63% of surveyed students purchased their textbooks new and 56%
of surveyed students purchase used textbooks. NACS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM
STUDENT WATCH, supra note 96.
Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences, struggled to define
price discrimination. “Roughly, it can be said that the producer pricediscriminates when two units of the same physical good are sold at different
prices, either to the same consumer or to different consumers.” JEAN TIROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133 (2d. ed. 1989).
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 568 U.S. 519, 557 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 557–58.
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From a legal standpoint, price discrimination rarely raises a
competition problem.117 From a policy standpoint, the Justices have to
balance the interests of the end-user and the copyright owners.
From a societal welfare analysis standpoint, price discrimination
has ambiguous effects. Price discrimination can increase societal
welfare. It can be used to cross-subsidize between consumers. These
cross-subsidies can increase welfare when compared to a market
without price discrimination.118
117

118

Most forms of price discriminations do not raise legal issues. The Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914 prohibits the discrimination “in price between different
purchasers . . . substantially to lessen competition.” Pub. L. No 63-212, § 2, 38
Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C § 13 (2012)). For the most part,
it remains legal if it has no impact on competition (e.g., volume discounts
available to all consumers) or unenforced because parties struggle to prove
competitive effects. That is why most of the enforcement of § 2 of the Clayton
Act has focused on predatory pricing. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The
Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for
Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1262–71 (2010) (discussing the
diminished enforcement of price discrimination in the U.S.). Similarly, most
third-degree price discriminations do not raise legal issues either. Some forms of
price discrimination based on protected classes raise legal issues. For example,
offering different classes based on gender or ethnicity (e.g., offering different
wages) raises legal problems under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which amended
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 8838, § 3, 52 Stat. 1062; 63 Stat. 912 (1963). In the copyright context, copyright
holders are, in theory, able to enjoy a monopoly over their work. However, this
monopoly is not without limitation. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) published their latest
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Jan. 12, 2017). In these guidelines, the antitrust
authorities explain how copyright can be used to limit competition, and can be
found unlawful under a rule of reason. Id. at 6, 16–17. At the international level,
geographical price discrimination can raise trade violation concerns: dumping.
Richard I. Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Discovery of the
Predatory Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT’L LAW. 227, 227 (1977). The pricing
threshold to trigger dumping liability is lower than the predatory pricing
threshold under antitrust laws. Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of
Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 409, 410–12 (1987) (comparing predatory pricing under the RobinsonPatman Act and anti-dumping regulations and arguing that dumping can be
easier to prove because dumping does not require below-cost sales or intent). In
Kirtsaeng, it is unclear whether moving the textbook can raise dumping
concerns—the product would still be sold at a higher price in the U.S. than in
Thailand but below the U.S. manufacturing cost. The parties did not raise these
issues.
Varian, supra note 99, at 870–71.
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For example, assume that the market is composed of 100
consumers with a high valuation of the good, $10, and 100 consumers
with a low valuation, $5. To make a good, a company must incur $4
marginal cost per textbook and a fixed cost of $300. If the company
can price discriminate and avoid arbitrage, then it can charge $10 to
100 high-valuation consumers and $5 to 100 low-valuation consumers.
The company would collect $1,500 in revenues, incur $1,100 in costs,
and raise $400 in profits. If it cannot price discriminate, it must decide
between pricing at $10 and selling to 100 consumers or pricing at $5
and selling to 200 consumers. At $10, the company brings $1,000 in
revenues and incurs $700 in costs whereas at $5, it brings $1,000
revenues and incurs $1,100 in costs. Therefore, the company would be
better off pricing to the high-valuation consumers and avoid selling to
low-valuation consumers altogether. Profits would be $300. In this
case, the societal welfare would increase if the company was able to
price discriminate.119
However, price discrimination can also decrease societal welfare.
Assume that the company must pay $100 to maintain two prices and
the low valuation increases to $8. With price discrimination, the
company makes $600 charging $10 to high-valuation consumers and
$8 to low-valuation consumers. Without price discrimination, the
company makes $500 if it caters to both low and high types and $300
if it only caters to high types. Thus, the company would prefer to cater
to both types of consumers because it makes more profits. However,
society would be better off if it could not price discriminate because
societal welfare would be $700 ($500 in profits and $200 in consumer
welfare) as compared to $600 with price discrimination ($600 in
profits). In this case, the societal welfare would decrease if the
company was able to price discriminate.
This stylized example demonstrates how price discrimination can
affect societal welfare. These examples use two consumer types with
flat willingness to pay. However, demand is usually composed of more
consumer types, which makes the effect of price discrimination even
harder to generalize.

119

Societal welfare would be greater under a price discrimination scenario ($400)
as compared to no price discrimination ($300). Societal welfare is the sum of
consumer surplus and producer surplus. In this example, consumer surplus is
zero under both scenarios because the company sets the prices at the consumers’
willingness to pay; therefore, consumers receive no gains from consumption. So,
producer surplus (i.e., profits) equals societal welfare.
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More generally, when arbitrage restricts price discrimination,
companies can react in three ways. First, they can decide to only sell to
high-valuation consumers. Low-valuation consumers (i.e., foreign
consumers) are priced out of the market. Here, societal welfare usually
decreases because the profit from selling to low-valuation consumers
and the corresponding consumer surplus disappear. The company can
also increase the price because it need not worry about arbitrage with a
single price. Such a price increase further decreases societal welfare
because the high-valuation consumers’ consumer surplus would
decrease more than profits would increase.
Second, the company may decide to sell to both types. This
decreases the price for the high-valuation consumers. If the price
decreases post-prohibition, societal welfare increases because more
consumers (i.e., those in the U.S.) can afford the good.
Finally, the publisher (using the textbook market as an example)
can decide to price the textbook at a value between the two prices
selected under price discrimination. Within some countries, the
quantity demanded decreases as a function of the willingness to pay.120
Thus, pricing in between may be profitable depending on the elasticity
of the demand in each region. If the publisher adopts this strategy, the
price decreases in one geographic region while it increases in the
other.
However, even if the first sale doctrine enables arbitrage, the
company can still price differently between the two countries. For
example, the U.S. price could still reflect the Thailand price plus the
transport cost and other transaction costs (e.g., import duties).
The next section tests whether publishers reacted to the Kirtsaeng
decision.
B. Impact of Kirtsaeng on the Price of College Textbooks in
the United States
This section uses data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(“BLS”).121 The BLS collects data as part of its mission to collect,
120

121

The stylized example above uses flat willingness to pay (demand). But in
general, demand is downward sloping within each geographical region. The
price in each region determines the demand (i.e., budget constraint, taste for
English language textbook, etc.).
The data was collected as part of the BLS Consumer Price Index program.
College Tuition and Fees Increase 63 Percent Since January 2006, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/
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analyze, and disseminate economic information to support decisionmaking.122 The data on textbooks and college tuition is collected to
calculate the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). The BLS publishes the
college textbook data from December 2001 to the present.123 The BLS
publishes the college tuition data from December 1977 to the
present.124 The data is collected on college textbooks in the U.S. by
city average for all urban consumers.125
Figure 1 shows the relative prices of college textbooks, college
tuition, and the CPI from December 2001 (benchmark 100%) to
October 2018. Prices increased steadily over this period. By October
2018, the prices of both college textbooks and college tuition more
than doubled. The price of textbooks increased more rapidly after the
Kirtsaeng decision in March 2013.

122

123

124

125

college-tuition-and-fees-increase-63-percent-since-january-2006.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZZ9Q-EFN6].
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2020-2025, 2,
https://www.bls.gov/bls/bls-strategic-plan-2020-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ687Y7N].
Data
Series
CUUR0000SSEA011,
U.S.
BUREAU
LAB.
STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/data/ (click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on
the page; then enter “CUUR0000SSEA011” and click “next”; specify the
desired year range and click “Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5].
Data
Series
CUUR0000SEEB01,
U.S.
BUREAU
LAB.
STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/data/ (click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on
the page; then enter “CUUR0000SEEB01” and click “Next”; specify the desired
year range and click “Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5].
“The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures the change in prices paid by
consumers for goods and services. The CPI reflects spending patterns for each
of two population groups: all urban consumers and urban wage earners and
clerical workers. The all urban consumer group represents about 93 percent of
the total U.S. population. It is based on the expenditures of almost all residents
of urban or metropolitan areas, including professionals, the self-employed, the
poor, the unemployed, and retired people, as well as urban wage earners and
clerical workers. Not included in the CPI are the spending patterns of people
living in rural nonmetropolitan areas, farming families, people in the Armed
Forces, and those in institutions, such as prisons and mental hospitals. Consumer
inflation for all urban consumers is measured by two indexes, namely, the
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and the Chained
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U).” U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – MAY 2019, https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/cpi_06122019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K32-BFB3].
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Price of College Textbooks and
Tuition Prices 2001-2018 (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)

I tested the impact of the Kirtsaeng decision on the price of college
textbooks. To test this impact, I proceeded in two steps. First, I pooled
the information provided by the textbook and tuition index and
attempted to see whether the growth rate of textbook prices changed
post-Kirtsaeng. In other words, I carried a difference-in-difference for
the price of textbooks. Second, I estimated whether tuition should be
used as a control variable. The price of textbooks is likely related to
tuition as complementary goods. In other words, I used the tuition rate
as a control variable to see whether the Kirtsaeng decision affected the
price of textbooks.
As described, I first tested the following time series relationship:
𝑔! = 𝛼𝑔!"# + 𝛽𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- + 𝜀! ,
where 𝑔! represents the growth rate of the price of college
textbooks and tuition at time 𝑡, 𝛼 represents the autoregressive factor,
the 𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- is a dummy variable that measures the impact of
the Kirtsaeng decision taking the value “1” of textbook pricing post
2013 and 𝜀! represents the error term. 𝛽 is the estimator of interest.
This difference-in-difference estimation allows to test whether only
textbooks were affected by the decision.
College tuition should not have been affected by the Kirtsaeng
decision. College textbooks represent a marginal added cost to
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education as compared to college tuition. But college tuition and
college textbooks are probably affected by the same shocks (e.g.,
economic crisis). 𝛽 should be negative if the decision led to more
arbitrage, as Justice Ginsburg feared. 𝛽 should be positive if the
publishers reacted by getting rid of price discrimination because of
potential arbitrage and increasing prices in the U.S. as a consequence
to capture more profits. 𝛽 should be non-different from zero if the
decision had no effect.
Table 1 shows the results of these estimations. Estimation (1) looks
at the estimation described by the equation above. Estimations (2-6)
use an interaction variable between the dummy variable and the price
at 𝑡 − 1 to account for potential non-constant effects. Estimations (3)
and (5) include a time trend. Estimations (4) and (6) include year
dummies.
Estimations (5) and (6) control for the growth rate of median
weekly and hourly earnings (which data is available quarterly)126 and
of the CPI.127 Earnings should affect tuition and book prices because
they affect the ability of students to pay for those goods and services.
They also affect the outside opportunity of getting a college education.
The CPI also affects tuition and book prices as universities and book
publishers should adapt their prices to those changes to keep the real
price of books constant.128

126

127

128

Data Series LEU0252881500, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/
data/ (click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on the page; then enter
“LEU0252881500” and click “Next”; specify the desired year range and click
“Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5].
Data Series CUSR0000SA0, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data
(click “Series Report” from the left-hand column on the page; then enter
“CUSR0000SA0” and click “Next”; specify the desired year range and click
“Retrieve Data”) [https://perma.cc/RAR8-UXK5].
Note that the CPI is a composite indicator of which the price of textbooks and
the tuitions contribute. While these may create some estimation problems, the
weight attributed to textbooks and tuitions is so small in the CPI basket that it
should have little influence on the outcome.
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Table 1: Difference-in-difference regressions of the
growth rate of college textbook and tuition prices

Growth
rate of
price at
𝑡−1
PostKirtsaeng
Book
Dummy
PostKirtsaeng
& Book
Dummy ×
growth
rate at 𝑡 −
1
Growth
rate of
earnings
Growth
rate of the
CPI
Constant

Difference
-indifference

Difference
-indifference

Difference
-indifference

Difference
-indifference
(4)
0.328***
(0.56)

Difference-indifference
(quarterly
data)
(5)
-0.264***
(0.097)

Difference-indifference
(quarterly
data)
(6)
-0.288***
(0.104)

(1)
0.233***
(0.048)

(2)
0.351***
(0.053)

(3)
0.335***

-0.484***
(0.102)

-0.454***
(0.105)

-0.471***
(0.108)

0.263
(0.243)

0.269
(0.267)

-0.058
(0.115)

-0.068
(0.125)

0.295
(0.227)

0.341
(0.267)

0.0178***
(0.003)
Yes***

0.019***
(0.006)
No

No

Yes

132

132

-0.001
(0.001)

0.004***
(0.0005)
No

0.003***
(0.0004)
No

0.004***
(0.0008)
Yes

0.002
(0.002)
No

Time
trend
Year
No
No
No
Yes
dummy
Observat402
402
402
402
ion
Periods
Standard error in parenthesis
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%

Estimations (1-4) show that the prices of textbooks and tuition
have continued to increase steadily and exponentially over this period.
Once the growth rates of earnings and of the CPI are introduced in
estimations (5-6), the growth rates of textbook prices and tuition have
not followed the same pattern of exponential growth; instead, the
growth rates have oscillated around zero.
In estimations (1-4), the post-Kirtsaeng dummy shows that the
decision has had a negative and statistically significant effect on the
price of textbooks. Once the growth rate of earnings and CPI has been
controlled in estimations (5-6), the impact of the decision is positive
and not statistically different from zero. In other words, the price of
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textbooks did not grow faster or slower than the price of tuition after
the Kirtsaeng decision. The year dummies do not return statistically
significant results.
As described above, I then used tuition as a control variable
because college textbooks are a complement to college tuition. When a
textbook publisher sets their prices, they might consider the price of
tuition to determine whether to increase textbook prices. Thus, I tested
the following time series relationship:
𝑔.%%/,! = 𝛼𝑔.%%/,!"# + 𝛾𝑔!1(!(%,,!"# + 𝛽𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- + 𝜀! ,
where 𝑔.%%/,! represents the growth rate of the book prices and
𝑔!1(!(%,,! is the growth rate of tuition at time 𝑡, 𝛼 represents the
autoregressive factor, the 𝐷$%&!"'()!&*+,- is a same dummy variable,
and 𝜀! represents the error term. 𝛽 and 𝛾 are the estimators.
The estimations in Table 2 show the same estimations as those
presented in Table 1 using the price of tuition as a control variable.
Table 2: Regressions of the price of college textbooks

Growth rate of
book prices at
𝑡−1
Growth rate of
tuition prices at
𝑡−1
Post-Kirtsaeng
Book Dummy
Post-Kirtsaeng
& Book Dummy
× growth rate at
𝑡−1
Growth rate of
earnings
Growth rate of
the CPI
Constant

Ordinary
Least
Square

Ordinary
Least
Square

Ordinary
Least
Square

Ordinary
Least
Square
(4)
-0.154
(0.117)

Ordinary
Least Square
(prices
averaged per
quarter)
(5)
-0.165
(0.217)

Ordinary
Least Square
(prices
averaged per
quarter)
(6)
-0.539*
(0.284)

(1)
-0.127**
(0.073)

(2)
-0.028
(0.104)

(3)
-0.049
(0.108)

0.168**
(0.066)

0.155**
(0.070)

0.152**
(0.070)

0.183**
(0.071)

-0.131
(0.106)

-0.009
(0.128)

-0.154
(0.129)

-0.122
(0.137)

-0.062
(0.150)

0.109
(0.413)

0.415
(0.344)

0.002
(0.002)
No
Yes
201

0.117
(0.127)
0.301
(0.235)
0.014***
(0.003)
Yes
No
66

0.061
(0.142)
0.336
(0.234)
0.17**
(0.007)
No
Yes
66

-0.002
(0.001)

0.005***
(0.001)
No
No
201

0.004***
(0.0006)
No
No
201

0.005***
(0.001)
Yes
No
201

Time trend
Year dummy
Observation
Periods
Standard error in parenthesis
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%

2020

The First Sale Doctrine and Foreign Sales

195

In all estimations, the Kirtsaeng decision does not have a
statistically significant effect on the price of textbooks. In estimations
(1-4), the growth of textbook prices has followed the growth rate of
tuition. When controlling for earning and CPI growth in estimations
(5-6), the growth rate of tuition becomes insignificant. Therefore, both
earnings, CPI, and tuition may be picking up the same effects.129
Based upon the results from Table 1 and Table 2, the Kirtsaeng
decision does not have an effect on the growth rate of textbook prices.
Publishers have continued to increase the price of textbooks in the
U.S. over this period, but the rate of increase has not been affected by
the decision.
In other words, either the publishers increased the prices in foreign
countries to avoid arbitrage or they ignored Kirtsaeng and kept price
discriminating because arbitrage remains marginal. Unfortunately,
without information about the price change pre- and post-Kirtsaeng in
Thailand, it remains impossible to confirm one of these two
alternatives theories.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kirtsaeng decision expanded the first sale doctrine with
ambiguous effects on the author’s incentives to publish. On the one
hand, the doctrine makes copyrighted goods more desirable by
removing uncertainties. On the other hand, authors cannot price
discriminate geographically, which limits their ability to recoup
profits.
However, in the case of textbooks, authors have other incentives to
write textbooks than monetary rewards. Academic authors value
publications for prestige or tenure. Therefore, the Kirtsaeng decision
should not have affected the creation of textbooks but may have
affected the dissemination.
The Kirtsaeng decision does not bar price discrimination but
allows arbitrage.130 Cabolis et al. found that textbooks were more
129

130

Note that estimation removing the CPI for fear that the CPI picks up the weight
of the tuition and textbooks in the composite indicator returns similar results.
The Circuit Courts have applied the Kirtsaeng decision to mean that the first
sale doctrine allows the distribution and importation of copyrighted products
regardless of where the item was manufactured or first sold. See, e.g., Close v.
Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2018); Geophysical Serv., Inc. v.
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 850 F.3d 785, 793–94 (5th Cir. 2017); Omega
S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2015).
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expensive in the U.S. than in other international markets.131 They did
not observe the same phenomenon in the general audience book
markets.132 Malueg and Schwartz have found that if a monopolist does
not price discriminate, then it often ends up catering to the highvaluation consumers while foreclosing the low-valuation consumer
access to the good.133 These studies lend support to the idea that the
Kirtsaeng decision should lead to an increase in textbook prices in
Thailand without affecting prices in the U.S.
Some of Justice Ginsburg’s fears may not have been realized.134
The decision did not affect the U.S. textbook prices nor the price
growth rate. Over the period of observation (2001-18), textbook
publishers, however, have had to deal with other issues (e.g., digital
duplication and dissemination). Publishers have met these issues headon using the same technologies to create new business models (e.g.,
digital publishing, digital rental) that decrease the publishers’ reliance
on copyright to prevent resale. These technologies have made the first
sale doctrine almost redundant and could explain why the decision has
not had any marked effect on price.

131

132
133

134

Christos Cabolis et al., A Textbook Example of International Price
Discrimination, 95 ECON. LETTERS 91, 92 (2007) (finding that general audience
books are similarly priced internationally but textbooks are more expensive in
the U.S.).
Id.
David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion,
and International Price Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167, 191 (1994).
For the publisher in Kirtsaeng, John Wiley & Sons, about half of its revenues
come from foreign sales. From this half, an even smaller fraction comes from
textbooks sold abroad. The fraction has not changed over the years. See e.g.,
Financial
Highlights,
JOHN
WILEY
&
SONS,
INC.
(2011),
https://www.wiley.com/legacy/annual_reports/ar_2011/financial.html
[https://perma.cc/SMQ2-NFF7]; Financial Highlights, JOHN WILEY & SONS,
INC. (2010), https://www.wiley.com/legacy/annual_reports/ar_2010/ financial.
html [https://perma.cc/SR6W-FE3Y]; Wiley Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal
Year 2018 Results, WILEY (June 12, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://
newsroom.wiley.com/press-release/all-corporate-news/wiley-reports-fourthquarter-and-fiscal-year-2018-results
[https://perma.cc/83R4-QQ5J];
Wiley
Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal 2017 Results, WILEY (June 13, 2017, 8:00
AM),
http://newsroom.wiley.com/press-release/all-corporate-news/wileyreports-fourth-quarter-and-fiscal-2017-results [https://perma.cc/WY56-HS7R].

